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Abstract—Despite their well-known security problems, pass-
words are still the incumbent authentication method for virtually
all online services. To remedy the situation, end-users are very
often referred to password managers as a solution to the pass-
word reuse and password weakness problems. However, to date
the actual impact of password managers on password security
and reuse has not been studied systematically.
In this paper, we provide the first large-scale study of the
password managers’ influence on users’ real-life passwords. From
476 participants of an online survey on users’ password creation
and management strategies, we recruit 170 participants that
allowed us to monitor their passwords in-situ through a browser
plugin. In contrast to prior work, we collect the passwords’ entry
methods (e.g., human or password manager) in addition to the
passwords and their metrics. Based on our collected data and
our survey, we gain a more complete picture of the factors that
influence our participants’ passwords’ strength and reuse. We
quantify for the first time that password managers indeed benefit
the password strength and uniqueness, however, also our results
also suggest that those benefits depend on the users’ strategies
and that managers without password generators rather aggravate
the existing problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since several decades textual passwords prevail as the default
authentication scheme for virtually all online services [45].
Despite various research efforts, no ideal alternative scheme
has yet been found to replace passwords [12], [31] for the
simple reasons that, in contrast to their contenders, they are
very intuitive to use as well as very inexpensive and effortless
to deploy. At the same time, research has again and again
demonstrated that passwords perform extremely poor in terms
of security [48]. For instance, various recent attacks exploit
the "human factor" of passwords, viz that humans fail to
create strong passwords themselves [11], [21], [46], [32], [35].
Even worse, there is an observable trend towards an increasing
number of online services that users register to. This increasing
number of required passwords in combination with the limited
human capacity to remember passwords lead to the bad practice
of re-using passwords across accounts at an alarming rate [27],
[50], [17], [65].
In the past, different solutions have been implemented to help
users creating stronger passwords, such as password meters
and policies, which are also still subject of active research [42],
[53], [18], [46], [68]. Among the most often recommended
solutions [29], [58], [52], [61], [55] to these problems for end-
users is technical support in form of password management
software. Those password managers come as integrated parts
of our browsers, as a plugin to our browsers, or as separate
applications. Password managers are being recommended as a
solution because they fulfill important usability and security
aspects at the same time: They store all the users’ passwords
so the users do not have to memorize them; they can also help
users entering their passwords by automatically filling them into
log-in forms; and they can also offer help in creating unique,
random passwords. By today, there are several examples for
third party password managers that fit this description, such
as Lastpass [5], 1Password [1], and even seemingly unrelated
security software, such as anti-virus [4] solutions.
Unfortunately, it has not been sufficiently studied in the past
whether password managers fulfill their promise and indeed
have a positive influence on password security or not? To break
this question down, we are interested in 1) whether password
managers actually store strong passwords that are likely auto-
generated by, for instance, password generators, or if they
really are just storage where users save their self-made, likely
weak passwords? Further, we are interested whether 2) users,
despite using password managers, still reuse passwords across
different websites or if do they use the managers’ support to
maintain a large set of unique passwords for every distinct
service? Prior works [65], [50] that studied password reuse
and strength in-situ have also considered password managers
as factors, but did not find an influence by managers and could
not conclusively answer those questions.
Our contributions: We argue that to specifically study
the impact of password managers, two important aspects were
missing in prior work, which we contribute in this paper. First,
previous works considered only the presence of password
management software on the user device (potentially even
mixed with other factors) and whether a password was auto-
filled or not. However, to better distinguish the storage option of
a password (i.e., memorized and manually entered, auto-filled
by the browser, copy&pasted, or filled by a browser plugin) a
more fine-grained entry method detection is required. Second,
users do not axiomatically follow strict workflows for password
creation over storage to entry [28], [30], [61], [55], [57] (see
Figure 1). For instance, the effort users are willing to invest in
creating a new unique and strong password often depends on
the privacy-sensitivity of the associated account/website. For
creating a new password, the approaches range from mental
algorithms (e.g., leetifying a well-known word) over pen&paper
algorithms and separate password generator tools (e.g., websites
like https://www.random.org/passwords/ or command line tools
like pwgen [6]) to 3rd party password managers (e.g., LastPass,
KeePass, 1Password, etc.). Based on different factors, such as
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Figure 1. Users’ strategies for password creation and storage plus the stages of our study to investigate password managers’ influence.
technical skills, trust in software vendors, financial expenditure,
multi-device support, or others, user resort to different password
storage strategies from where the password finds its way via
different entry methods into the website form fields. To better
study password managers’ influence, one has to take the users’
creation and storage strategies into consideration as well. In
particular, one has to understand if the user pursues primarily
a creation strategy based on password manager support and
whether there then exists an observable effect of this strategy
on the password strength and reuse.
In this paper, we present a study that reflects those con-
siderations (see bottom of Figure 1). We first recruited 476
participants on Amazon MTurk to conduct a survey sampling
to better understand the users strategies for creating and
storing passwords, their attitudes towards passwords, and
past experiences with password leaks or password managers.
From those insights, we identified two distinct groups in
our participant pool: users of password managers and users
abstaining from technical help in password creation. We were
further able to recruit 170 of our participants, 49 of which
reported using password managers, for a follow-up study in
which our participants allowed us to monitor their passwords
through a Google Chrome browser plugin that collected
password metrics as well as answers to in-situ questionnaires
upon password entry. This gave us detailed information about
real-life passwords, including their strength, their reuse, and,
for the first time, their entry method (e.g., manually typed,
auto-filled, pasted, or entered by a browser plugin) as well as
the passwords’ context, including user reported value of the
password (e.g., loss of social repudiation or financial harm
when the password would be leaked).
Based on the combined data from our survey sampling and
our plugin-based data collection, we are able to study the
factors that influence password strength and reuse from a new
perspective. Using exploratory data analysis and statistical
testing, including regression models, we show that password
managers indeed influence password strength and reuse. In
particular, the relation between different entry methods and
the password strength depends on the users’ entire process of
password handling. Using a workflow that includes technical
support from password creation through storage to password
entry leads to stronger passwords, while this positive effect
cannot be detected when considering the input method individ-
ually. For password reuse the picture is even more complex.
Passwords entered by a tool that also supports the user during
the creation of passwords were significant more unique than
passwords entered by hand. But looking at mangers that do
not offer this feature, such as Chrome’s auto-fill, we found
the opposite effect that those managers even contribute to the
problem of password reuse. Lastly, our results also affirm and
extend some prior results about reuse as a rampant problem
and users’ password behaviors.
Outline: The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section II gives an overview of related work on studying
password security. Section III presents the methodology of
our study and data collection. We describe the results and
analysis of our collected data in Section IV and then discuss
implications and limitations of study in Section V. Finally, we
offer some concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Text passwords are since decades [45] the incumbent
authentication scheme for online services [30], [31], and will
very likely remain in that position for the foreseeable future.
They distinguish themselves from alternative schemes through
their very intuitive usage and easy deployment, however, as well
as through a pathological inability of users to create strong
passwords that withstand guessing attacks [12]. Given the
permanence of passwords, end-users are commonly referred to
technical help in form of password management software [29],
[58], [52], [55] to create strong, unique passwords.
In this paper, we aim to better understand how password
managers help users in this task and to try to measure the impact
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password managers actually have on the current status quo.
We do this through a comprehensive study that includes both
self-reported user strategies and factors for password creation
and storage as well as in-situ collected password metrics and
questionnaire answers. To put our approach into the larger
context and to provide necessary background information, in
this section we give an overview of prior research on how
users select passwords, how users (re-)use passwords, how
password strength can be measured, and on dedicated studies
of password manager software.
A. Password creation
Different works have studied the strategies of users and
the factors that influence the selection of new passwords. For
instance, users create passwords based on something that has
relevance to them or has meaning to them [55], and very often
passwords are based on a dictionary word [39], [51].
The effort the user is willing to invest into creating a stronger
passwords can depend on different factors. For example,
advice and password policies that enforce a certain password
composition (i.e., length and character classes) can influence
the user [70], [27], [39]. Similarly, many websites use password
strength meters to provide users real-time feedback on their
new password’s strength and nudge users into creating stronger
passwords [24], [60]. However, often those policies and meters
have inconsistent metrics across different websites [13], [64],
[19], potentially confusing users about what constitutes a
strong password [61]. Also the value of the password protected
account can influence the user. Prior studies [9], [49], [55],
[50] concluded that people try to create strong passwords for
accounts that they consider more important, such as banking
websites. In particular, users employed password manager for
specific matters [55] such as just using at a work PC but not at
home, or not using password managers for banking websites.
Despite their apparent benefits, it is unclear how users actually
use such password managers and what the exact impact of
password managers is on password reuse and password strength.
B. Password strength
Password strength has been studied for several years. There
are different mechanisms that can be use to measure the
strength of passwords. The Shannon entropy [23] equation
provides a way to estimate the average minimum number
of bits needed to encode a string of symbols, based on the
frequency of the symbols. This formula was formerly used by
the NIST guidelines [29] to estimate the strength of password
based on the length of the passwords. However, more recent
research [67], [11], [20], [41] argued that guessability metrics
are a more realistic metric than the common used entropy
metrics, and recommendation such as NIST [29] recently
picked the results of this line of research up and updated
their recommendations accordingly. One of the vital insights
from this and other research [35] was that passwords are not
chosen randomly but exhibit common patterns and are derived
from a limited set of dictionary words.
Measuring a password’s guessability has been realized in
different ways. Those include Markov models [14], [21],
pattern matching plus word mangling rules [68], [66], or
neural networks [46]. Since prior password strength meters
were based on the password composition and the resulting
entropy, those new approaches also found their way into
contending password strength meter implementations [68], [46],
[59]. However, varying cracking algorithms or techniques can
cause varying password strength results based on configuration,
methods, or training data [62]. Also in our study we measure
the password strength based on guessability, using the openly
available zxcvbn [68] tool.
C. Password reuse
Prior work [55] have shown that users have an increasing
number of online accounts that require creation of a new
password. To cope with the task of remembering a large number
of passwords, users resort to reusing passwords across different
accounts [17], [38], creating a situation in which one password
leak might affect multiple accounts at once. A large-scale
data collection through an instrumented browser [27] was first
to highlight this problem. Since then, newer studies further
illustrated the issue of password reuse. For instance, in a
combination of measurement study of real leaked passwords
and user survey [17], 43% of the participants reused passwords
and often a new password was merely a small modification
of an existing password. As with password creation, different
factors can influence the password reuse. For example, it was
shown that the rate of reused passwords increased with the
number of accounts [28], which is troublesome considering
that users accumulate an increasing number of accounts. As
with password strength, also the value of the website can affect
whether a user creates a unique new password or reuses an
existing one [9], [50].
Closest to our methodology are two recent studies [65],
[50] based on data collected from the users’ browsers with
plugins. Both studies monitored websites for password entries
and recorded the password characteristics, such as length and
composition, a participant-specific password hash, the web
domain (or domain category), as well as meta-information
including installed browser plugins, or installed software (e.g.,
anti-virus software). In case of the newer study [50], also
hashes of sub-strings of the password were collected as well
as a strength estimate using a neural network based password
meter [46] and whether the password was auto-filled or not.
Through this data, both studies had an unprecedented, in-situ
insight into user’s real password behavior, the factors influ-
encing password reuse, and could show that password reuse,
even partial reuse of passwords, is a rampant problem. Further
relating to our work, both prior studies also considered the
potential influence of password managers, however, could not
find any significant effect of password managers on password
reuse or strength. However, their studies were not specifically
targeted at investigating the impact of password managers,
and with our methodology we extend those prior works in
two important aspects. First, prior work only considered the
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presence of password manager and whether auto-fill was used.
For our work, we derived a more fine-grained detection of the
password entry method, which allows us to distinguish human,
plugin-based, auto-fill, or copy&pasted input to password fields
and thus better detection of managed passwords. Second,
merely the entry method of password does not reveal its
origin (e.g., passwords from a password manager might also
be copy&pasted or saved in the browser’s auto-fill). To study
the impact of password managers, a broader view is essential
that includes the users’ password creation strategies in addition
to their in-situ behavior.
D. Security and usability of password managers
Password manager software has also been the subject of
research. For instance, human-subject studies [40], [15] have
shown that password managers might suffer from usability
problems and that ordinary users might abstain from using
them due to trust issues or because they see a necessity. Like
any other software, password manager might also contain
vulnerabilities or errors [44], [71] that can compromise user
information, and new guidance for developers of password
management software were derived. Also the integration of
password manager, in particular the password auto-filling, was
scrutinized [54], [56] and vulnerabilities discovered that can
help an adversary to sniff passwords during the auto-fill process.
III. METHODOLOGY
For our study of password managers’ impact on password
strength and reuse, we use data collected from paid workers
of Amazon’s crowd-sourcing service Mechanical Turk1. We
collected the data in three different stages: 1) an initial survey
sampling, 2) collection of in-situ password metrics, and 3) an
exit survey. In the following, we describe those three stages in
more detail.
Ethical concerns: The protocols implemented in those two
stages were approved by the ethical review board2 of the faculty
of Mathematics and Computer Science at Saarland University.
We also took the strict German data and privacy protection
laws into account for collecting, processing, and storing any
participant information. Further, we followed the guidelines
for academic requesters outlined by MTurk workers [22]. All
server-side software (i.e., a LimeSurvey Community Edition
software and a self-written server application for our plugin-
based data collection) was self-hosted on a maintained and
hardened university server. Web access to the server was
secured with an SSL certificate issued by the university’s
computing center and all further access was restricted to the
department’s intranet and only made available to maintainers
and collaborating researchers. Participants could leave the study
at any time during the two stages.
A. Password survey
In our survey sampling, we asked the participants about their
general privacy attitude, their attitude towards passwords, their
1https://www.mturk.com/
2https://erb.cs.uni-saarland.de/
skills and strategies for creating and managing passwords, as
well as basic demographic questions. Those information enable
us, on the one hand, to gain a general overview of common
password creation and storage strategies in the wild. On the
other hand, those information help us in detecting and avoiding
any potential biases in the later stages of our study. The full
survey contained 31–34 questions, depending on conditional
questions, categorized in 6 different groups (see Appendix A).
We first asked for their privacy attitude using the standard
Westin index [43]. However, since the Westin index has been
shown to be an unreliable measure of the actual privacy-related
actions of users [69], we also asked about the participants’ atti-
tude towards passwords (e.g., whether they consider passwords
to be futile in protecting their privacy). This should help in
better understanding if participants are actually motivated to
put effort in creating stronger and unique passwords. We further
asked about the participants’ strategies for password creation
and management in order to get a more complete picture about
the possible origins of passwords in our dataset. Lastly, we
collected demographic information about the participants.
All qualitative answers (e.g., free text answers to Q9 or
Q22 in Appendix A) were independently coded in a bottom-up
fashion by two researchers. For the coding tasks, the researcher
achieved an initial agreement between 95.6% (Q9) and 97.1%
(Q22) and all differences could be resolved in agreement.
Participation in the survey was open to any MTurk worker
that fulfilled the following criteria, which we copied from
MTurk-based studies in psychological research: the worker has
to be located in the US and the number of previously approved
tasks has to be at least 100 or at least 70% all of tasks. By
using MTurk, we ensured that all participants were at least 18
years old. The estimated time for answering the survey was
10–15 minutes and we paid workers $4 for participation.
In total, 505 MTurk workers participated in our survey
between August 2017 and October 2017. After discarding
responses that failed attention test questions [34], were an-
swered too fast to be done thoughtfully, or that were duplicates
(e.g., same human worker with different IDs), we ended up
with 476 valid responses.
Lastly, we also asked whether the participant would be
willing to participate in a follow-up study, in which we measure
in an anonymized, privacy-protecting fashion the strength and
reuse of their passwords. Only participants that indicated
interest in the follow-up study were considered potential
candidates for our Chrome plugin-based data collection. Only
21 workers were not interested.
B. Chrome plugin based data collection
To collect in-situ data about passwords, including their
strength, reuse, entry method, and domain, we created a Chrome
browser plugin that monitors the input to password fields of
loaded websites and then sends all collected metrics back to
our server once the user logs into the loaded website. We
distributed our Chrome plugin via the Google Web Store to
invited participants. The plugin was unlisted in the Google
Web Store, so that only participants to which we sent the
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link to the plugin store website were able to install it. Our
primary selection criterion for participant selection was that
they use Chrome as their primary browser and are not using
exclusively mobile devices (smartphones and tablets) to browse
the web; besides that we aimed for an unbiased sampling from
the participants pool with respect to the participants’ privacy
attitude, attitude towards passwords, demographics, and usage
of password managers. Between September and October 2017,
we invited 364 participants from the survey sampling via MTurk
to the study, of which 174 started and 170 finished participation.
Participants that finished the task were compensated with $20.
To monitor password entries, we follow and extend prior
approaches on password monitoring [50], [65], [27]. Our plugin
searches in the DOM tree of the currently loaded website for
input elements with type ’password’ and registers different
event listeners for those identified elements, which monitor
key presses, key down/up events, or paste events. To detect
login attempts that would submit the entered password to the
website, the plugin registers listeners for different forms of
webform submission (e.g., inputs with type button or submit,
or div elements with special roles, such as button) as well as
for pressing the enter key in the detected password field. A
limitation of this approach is that the website structure has to
follow common programming patterns (e.g., input types and
submission forms). During our pilot testing with Alexa’s top
100 websites, we observed only three websites that failed this
assumption: two adult entertainment websites and msn.com.
Once a login attempt is detected, the plugin analyzes the
recorded events and input to the password field. As a result of
that analysis, the plugin collects the following metrics about
the entered passwords:
Composition: The length of the password as well as the
frequency of each character class.
Strength: The password strength measured in Shannon and
NIST entropy as well as zxcvbn score. Shannon and NIST
entropy have been used in prior works [25], [65], [24] as
measure of password strength and complexity and are collected
primarily to be backwards compatible in our analysis with
prior research. However, since entropy has been shown to
be a poor measurement of the actual "crackability" of the
password [67], we use the zxcvbn [68] score as the more
realistic estimator of the password strength in our analysis.3
Zxcvbn4 by Dropbox [68] is password strength estimator
that uses pattern matching (e.g., repeats, sequences, keyboard
patterns), (common) password dictionaries (including leaked
passwords, names, English dictionary words), and mangling
rules (e.g., l33t speak) to estimate the crackability of passwords.
It estimates every password’s strength on a scale from 0
(weakest) to 4 (strongest). In our plugin we used the zxcvbn
library [3] with its default settings. For instance, the password
!@#$%^&*() is estimated with score 1, since it consists of
a straight row of keys, and AiWuutaiveep9, which was
randomly generated, with score 4.
3Unfortunately, the fully trained neural network based strength estimator of
[50], [46] was not publicly available.
4https://github.com/dropbox/zxcvbn
Table I
ZXCVBN SCORES FOR 200 MILLION UNIQUE PASSWORDS FROM
HASHES.ORG. GUESSES ARE IN LOG10.
Guesses (in log10)
Score Count Mean SD Min 25% 50% 75% Max
0 122,296 2.69 0.42 0.30 2.48 2.92 3.00 3.00
1 34,496,960 5.34 0.59 3.00 5.00 5.44 5.87 6.00
2 69,090,776 7.15 0.66 6.00 6.61 7.00 7.87 8.00
3 57,256,840 8.87 0.65 8.00 8.28 8.87 9.36 10.00
4 39,789,207 12.51 2.29 10.00 11.00 12.00 13.36 32.00
To better understand zxcvbn’s scoring, we used zxcvbn to
score 200 million unique passwords collected from hashes.org,
where we measured the zxcvbn score and the corresponding
guesses in log10. The results in Table I show that each zxcvbn
score has a corresponding bin of guesses, e.g., passwords with
score 2 require between 103–106 guesses, and passwords that
need more than 1010 guesses are rated with score 4.
Website category: The category of the website domain
according to the Alexa Web Information Service [2].
Entry method: The method through which the password was
entered, such as human, Chrome built-in password manager,
copy&paste, 3rd party password manager plugin, or external
password manager program. The heuristics to detect the entry
method are described separately in Section III-B1.
In-situ questionnaire: The participant’s answers to a short
questionnaire about the entered password and website (see
Section III-B2). In particular, we ask the participants about
the website’s value for their privacy. Other studies used the
website category as a proxy for this value [50] and in our study
we wanted first-hand knowledge.
Hashes: Adapting the methodology of [50], [65], we collect
the hash of the entered password as well as the hash of every
4-character sub-string of the password. We use a keyed hash
(i.e., PBKDF2 with SHA-256), where the key is generated and
stored at the client side and never revealed to us, and only
collected the first half of the resulting hash. This still allows
identification of (partially) reused passwords per participant
with a negligible error chance and makes a trade-off in favor
of the participants’ privacy (see also Section III-B3). In the
remainder of this paper, we will use the notions of partial,
exact, and partial-and-exact reuse introduced in [50]. Exactly
reused passwords are identical with another password, partially
reused passwords share a substring with another password,
and partially-and-exactly reused passwords have both of those
characteristics. Like [50], [65], we cannot compare passwords
across participants.
1) Detecting the entry method: Detection of the password
entry method uses the different listeners registered by our
plugin and follows the decision tree depicted in Figure 2. If
our plugin detects any kind of typing inside the password field
((A)=Y in Figure 2) and the typing speed is too fast to be from
a human typist ((B)=N), we conclude that an external password
manager program (such as KeePass) mimics a human typist by
"replaying" the keyboard inputs of the password. Otherwise
((B)=Y), we assume a manually entered password. As threshold
between human and an external program mimicking a human
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Figure 2. Decision tree of our plugin to detect password entry methods
Table II
UUIDS OF KNOWN PLUGINS THAT ARE DETECTED BY OUR STUDY PLUGIN
Name UUID
Dashlane fdjamakpfbbddfjaooikfcpapjohcfmg
LastPass hdokiejnpimakedhajhdlcegeplioahd
1Password aomjjhallfgjeglblehebfpbcfeobpgk
Roboform pnlccmojcmeohlpggmfnbbiapkmbliob
Enpass kmcfomidfpdkfieipokbalgegidffkal
Zoho Vault igkpcodhieompeloncfnbekccinhapdb
Norton Identity Safe iikflkcanblccfahdhdonehdalibjnif
KeePass ompiailgknfdndiefoaoiligalphfdae
typist, we set an average key press time of 30 ms. This is
based on the observation that external programs usually do
not consider mimicking the key press time (i.e., duration of
keypress), while some of them enter the password character-
wise with varying speeds. In case there was no typing in
the password field detected ((A)=N) and a paste event was
observed ((C)=Y), we consider the password to be pasted into
the field, either by a human or by an external program. In
either of those two cases the password is managed external
to the browser in digital form. If no paste event was detected
((C)=N) and the Chrome auto-fill event was observed, this
indicates that Chrome filled the password field from its internal,
built-in password manager (i.e., "save password feature"). If
Chrome auto-fill has not filled the password field ((D)=N),
we check the list of installed plugins for known plugins of
password manager solutions, such as LastPass, 1Password,
etc. Chrome plugins are identified through a 32 characters
long ID that can be retrieved from Google’s Chrome Web
Store (e.g., hdokiejnpimakedhajhdlcegeplioahd for the
LastPass plugin). Our plugin checks for eight well-known
password manager plugins (see Table II) and reports the ones
installed in the participant’s browser, or an "unknown" value
in case none of those eight was found.
In this decision tree, we make the assumption that the
user does not enter the password with a mixture of the
different entry methods (e.g., pasting a part of the password and
complementing it with typing). For instance, we do not check if
there was a paste event when typing was detected. Such mixture
Figure 3. In-situ questionnaire when a login to new website is detected.
of entry methods will hence result in misclassification of the
detected entry method. However, we assume that such user
behavior is too rare to affect our results statistical significantly.
2) Participant instructions: We provided our participants
with a project website that gave a step-by-step introduction on
how install our plugin, how to set it up, how to use it, and how
to remove it post-participation. Google’s Web Store provided
our participants with a very comfortable way of adding the
plugin to their browser. To set the plugin up, participants had to
simply enter their MTurk worker ID into the plugin. The worker
ID was used as a pseudonym throughout this study to identify
data of them same participant. After setup, the plugin starts
monitoring the users’ websites for password entries. For every
newly detected domain to which a password was submitted, our
plugin asked the participant to answer a short three question
questionnaire about the participants’ estimate of the website’s
value, the participants’ strength estimate of the just entered
password, and whether the login was successful (see Figure 3).
Every participant was instructed to use the plugin for four days,
after which the plugin released a completion code to be entered
into the task on MTurk to finish participation and collect the
payment. We also instructed participants to act naturally and
not change their usual behavior during those four days in order
to maximize the ecological validity of our study. The only
exceptions from the usual behavior were the installation of
our plugin and a request to re-login to all websites where they
have an account in order to ensure a sufficient enough quantity
of collected data.
3) Addressing privacy concerns: A particular consideration
of our study design were the potential privacy concerns of our
participants. Since we essentially ask our participants to install
a key-logger that monitors some of the most privacy-sensitive
data, this might make participants wary of the study and repel
them from participating. Due to the lack of any form of in
person interview or consultation between the researchers and
the participants, we tried to address those concerns through
a high level of transparency, support, and collecting only the
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Figure 4. Notice by our plugin about the collected data for the current website.
minimal amount of data in a privacy-protecting fashion, which
also follows the guidelines for academic requesters [22] as
outlined by the MTurk community.
First, we explained on our project website exactly the
motivation behind our study and why acting naturally is
important for our results. In this context, we provided a
complete list of all data that our plugin collects, for which
purpose, and why this data collection does not enable use to
steal (or break) the participants passwords. We also answered
all participants’ questions in this regard that were sent to us
via email or posted in known MTurk review and discussion
forums. We received feedback from workers that this level of
openness has convinced them to participate in the study.
Second, to further ensure transparency, we asked concerned
workers with IT background to review the code of our plugin,
which is distributed in an authenticated way via the Google
Web Store. However, to the best of our knowledge, no worker
that investigated the code has publicly reported about it.
Third, we limited the extent of the collected data to the
necessary minimum while still being able to study password
managers’ impact. For instance, we only collect the first suc-
cessful login to any website, thus abstaining from monitoring
the participants’ browsing behavior. Further, we only collect
the website category and not the website URL. This trade-off
between participants’ privacy and data accuracy comes at the
cost of data completeness, since the category of any URL not
in the category database of our plugin is unknown to us. Our
plugin currently contains the category for the top 28,651 web
domains in Alexa at the time the study was conducted.5 Lastly,
similar to [50], we collect the password hashes such that we
are unable to recover the original password, while still being
able to detect (partially) reused passwords for each participant.
5This is the number of web domains in the top 100K list, for which a
category was assigned by Alexa.
Fourth, every participant could inspect the collected data
prior to sending them to our server. Figure 4 shows the
information screen for participants, which lists the collected
information. Moreover, the data collection can be avoided for
highly sensitive websites the participant does not want to be
collected by simply not answering the questionnaire. Only
data for websites where the questionnaire (in Figure 3) was
answered by the participant were collected by the plugin.
C. Exit survey
In the last stage of our study, we conducted a short, four
question exit survey to better understand the reasons why users
do not adopt external password manager software. In particular,
we asked for the concrete reason why they do not use such a
software, whether they have in the past, and if so, why they
stopped using it. For this survey, we invited participants that
noted in their survey that they do not use any extra password
manager software and for which we could corroborate this
claim in our collected data. We invited them via email through
MTurk. From 113 invited workers, 109 answered the exit survey.
Each worker was compensated with $1.50 for participation.
IV. STUDYING PASSWORD MANAGERS’ IMPACT
In this section, we analyze our collected data, but leave the
discussion of the results for Section IV. We start with our
participants’ demographics. We then present a brief overview
of our participants’ password reuse and strength in general
and afterwards introduce a grouping of our participants based
on their creation strategy. We then present a short case-study
of LastPass users. Finally, we study the impact of different
management and creation strategies on the password reuse and
strength by exploring correlations between those factors.
A. Demographics
Table III provides an overview of the demographics of
our participants that answered our survey on passwords, that
we invited to the plugin-based study, and that participated
in the plugin-based data collection. Noticeable is that we
invited participants in equal parts from every demographic
group and that also every demographic group participated
in almost equal parts in the plugin-based data collection.
We us a Mann-Whitney rank test [26] to test for significant
differences between the demographic distributions of the 476
participants in the survey sampling and the 170 participants
in the plugin-based study, and could not find any statistically
significant (p < .05) differences between those two groups.
In general, our participants’ demographics are closer to the
commonly observed demographics of qualitative studies in
university settings than to the demographics of the 2010 US
census [63]. Our participants’ number is skewed towards male
participants (57.6% identified themselves as male). Also, our
participants covered an age range from 18 to more than 70
years, where our sample skews to younger participants (75.2%
of our study participants are younger than 40) as can be
commonly observed in behavioral research, including password
studies and usable security. The majority of our participants had
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Table III
DEMOGRAPHICS OF OUR SURVEY SAMPLING, OF OUR SELECTION OF
INVITED PARTICIPANTS FOR THE FOLLOW-UP STUDY, AND OF PARTICIPANTS
THAT FINISHED THE PLUGIN-BASED STUDY. PERCENTAGES INDICATE THE
FRACTION W.R.T. INITIAL SIZE IN THE SURVEY SAMPLING.
Survey Invited to study Participated
Number of participants 476 364 170
Gender
Female 200 156 (78.0%) 73 (36.5%)
Male 274 208 (75.9%) 97 (35.4%)
Other 1 0 0
No answer 1 0 0
Age group
18–30 180 139 (77.2%) 64 (35.6%)
31–40 178 135 (75.8%) 63 (35.4%)
41–50 71 58 (81.7%) 32 (45.1%)
51–60 35 24 (68.6%) 8 (22.9%)
61–70 11 7 (63.6%) 2 (18.2%)≥71 1 1 (100%) 1 (100%)
Computer science background
Yes 91 64 (70.3%) 27 (29.7%)
No 385 300 (77.9%) 143 (37.1%)
Native language
English 468 358 (76.5%) 167 (35.7%)
Other 8 6 (75.0%) 3 (37.5%)
Education level
Less than high school 3 3 (100%) 1 (33.3%)
High school graduate 68 53 (77.9%) 26 (38.2%)
Some college, no degree 117 85 (72.6%) 34 (29.1%)
Associate’s degree 79 64 (81.0%) 34 (43.0%)
Bachelor degree 174 133 (76.4%) 62 (35.6%)
Ph.D 2 1 (50.0%) 1 (50.0%)
Graduate/prof. degree 32 25 (78.1%) 12 (37.5%)
Other 1 0 0
Ethnicity
White/Caucasian 355 274 (77.2%) 123 (34.6%)
Black/African American 50 38 (76.0%) 25 (50.0%)
Asian 31 23 (74.2%) 9 (29.0%)
Hispanic/Latino 27 21 (77.8%) 12 (44.4%)
Native American/Alaska 1 0 0
Multiracial 7 5 (71.4%) 1 (14.3%)
Other 5 3 (60.0%) 0
Table IV
PRIMARY BROWSERS USED, AS REPORTED BY 476 OUR PARTICIPANTS.
PERCENTAGES IN RELATION TO OVERALL NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS.
Browser Chrome Firefox Safari Opera IE/Edge Other
Share 385 71 7 6 1 6
(80.9%) (14.9%) (1.5%) (1.3%) (0.2%) (1.3%)
no computer science background (80.88%) and was English
speaking (98.3%). Most of the participants identified themselves
as of white/Caucasian ethnicity (74.6%). The participants also
covered a range of educational levels, where 14.3% are high
school graduates, 16.6% having an associate’s degree, 36.6%
having completed a Bachelor’s degree, 0.4% having a doctoral
degree, and 6.7% having completed a graduate or professional
degree. Further, 80.9% of our participants reported using
Chrome as their primary browser (see Table IV).
Since our study effectively asks participants to install a
password-logger, we were concerned with a potential opt-
in bias towards people that have low privacy concerns or
consider passwords as ineffective security measures. To this
end, we included the three questions of Westin’s Privacy
Segmentation Index [43] (Q1 in Appendix A) to capture our
participants’ general privacy attitudes (i.e., fundamentalists,
pragmatists, unconcerned). We further added two questions
Table V
PRIVACY ATTITUDE (ACCORDING TO WESTIN INDEX), ATTITUDE ABOUT
PASSWORDS, AND PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH PASSWORD LEAKAGE AMONG
OUR PARTICIPANTS IN THE SURVEY, LIST OF SELECTED PARTICIPANTS FOR
THE FOLLOW-UP STUDY, AND OF PARTICIPANTS THAT ACTUALLY
PARTICIPATED IN THE DATA COLLECTION.
Survey Invited to study Participated
Privacy concern (Westin index)
Fanatic 217 167 (77.0%) 66 (30.4%)
Unconcerned 86 56 (65.1%) 31 (36.0%)
Pragmatist 173 141 (81.5%) 73 (42.2%)
Attitude about passwords
Pessimist 9 8 (88.9%) 3 (33.3%)
Optimist 365 279 (76.4%) 132 (36.2%)
Conflicted 102 77 (75.5%) 35 (34.3%)
Prior password leak experienced
No 190 151 (79.5%) 72 (37.9%)
Yes 148 111 (75.0%) 58 (39.2%)
Not aware of 138 102 (73.9%) 40 (29.0%)
specifically about our participant’s attitude about passwords
(see Q4 in Appendix A), e.g., if passwords are considered a
futile protection mechanism or important for privacy protection.
Table V summarizes the results of those questions. Only
a minority of 86 of our survey participants are privacy
unconcerned and the majority of 365 participants believe in
the importance of passwords as a security measure. Almost a
third of our survey participants experienced a password leak in
the past. For our study we sampled in almost equal parts from
those different groups. Using a Mann-Whitney rank test, we
could not find any statistically significant differences between
the survey and study participants’ distribution of privacy and
password attitudes/experiences. Thus, we argue that the risk of
an opt-in bias towards either end of the spectrum for privacy
and password attitude is unlikely.
B. General password statistics
Tables VI and VII provide summary statistics of all pass-
words collected by our plugin. We collected from our 170
participants 1,045 unique passwords and 1,767 password entries
in total. That means, that our average participant entered
passwords to 10.40 distinct domains with a standard deviation
of 5.52 and median of 9. The lowest number of domains
per participant is 1 and the highest number is 27, where
the first quartile is 6 and the third quartile is 14. Those
numbers are hence slightly lower than those reported in recent
studies [50]. When considering only unique passwords, our
average participant has only 6.15 passwords, indicating that
passwords are reused frequently [28], [50]. Our participants
entered their passwords on average with 2.24 different entry
methods, where 24 participants used only one method and
8 participants used four different methods. Including all
passwords, our participants reused on average 70.56% of their
passwords, where exact-and-partial reuse is most common
with 36.46% of all passwords. Interestingly the minimum and
maximum in all reuse categories is 0% and 100%, respectively,
meaning that we have participants that did not reuse any of
their passwords as well as participants that exactly, partially,
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Table VI
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ALL 170 PARTICIPANTS IN OUR PLUGIN-BASED
DATA COLLECTION. LIKE [50], WE FIRST COMPUTED MEANS FOR EACH
PARTICIPANT AND THEN COMPUTED THE MEAN, MEDIAN, STANDARD
DEVIATION, AND MIN/MAX VALUES OF THOSE MEANS.
Statistic Mean Median SD Min Max
Number of passwords 10.39 9.00 5.52 1.00 27.00
Entry methods 2.24 2.00 0.75 1.00 4.00
Percentage reused passwords
Non-reused 29.44% 21.58% 28.25% 0.00% 100.00%
Only-exact-reused 15.72% 0.00% 24.43% 0.00% 100.00%
Only-partially-reused 18.38% 11.11% 19.88% 0.00% 100.00%
Exact-and-partial reused 36.46% 38.75% 30.88% 0.00% 100.00%
Password composition
Length 9.61 9.29 1.72 6.33 16.86
Character classes 2.52 2.50 0.58 1.00 3.94
Digits 2.54 2.38 1.24 0.25 6.73
Uppercase letters 0.85 0.67 0.81 0.00 4.62
Lowercase letters 5.92 5.72 1.96 1.67 15.50
Special characters 0.30 0.10 0.54 0.00 5.19
Password strength
Zxcvbn score 2.20 2.14 0.75 0.67 4.00
Shannon entropy 29.31 28.37 7.93 16.00 68.00
NIST entropy 23.50 23.00 2.98 17.17 35.69
Table VII
NUMBER OF DISTINCT PASSWORD ENTRIES WITH EACH ENTRY METHOD.
Entry method All passwords Unique passwords
Chrome auto-fill 949 (53.71%) 540 (51.67%)
Human 590 (33.39%) 331 (31.67%)
LastPass plugin 128 (7.24%) 100 (9.57%)
Copy&paste 55 (3.11%) 51 (4.88%)
Unknown plugin 41 (2.32%) 23 (2.20%)
External manager 4 (0.23%) 0 (0.00%)∑ 1,767 1,045
or partially-and-exactly reused all of their passwords. The
average password in our dataset had a length of 9.61 and was
composed of 2.52 character classes. The average zxcvbn score
was 2.20, where the participant with the weakest passwords
had an average of 0.67 and the participant with the strongest
passwords an average of 4.00. Like prior work [65], we observe
a significant correlation between password strength and reuse
(chi-square test: χ2 = 75.48, p < .001).
As shown in Table VII, the majority of the 1,767 logged
passwords was entered with Chrome’s auto-fill (53.71%)
followed by manual entry (33.39%). Although in our pilot
study various password manager plugins, e.g., KeePass and
1Password, had been correctly detected, in our actual study
only LastPass was used by our participants (128 or 7.24% of all
passwords). Copy&paste and unknown Chrome plugins formed
the smallest, relevant-sized shares and only four passwords
were entered programmatically by an external program.
With respect to general password reuse (see Figure 5), partial-
and-exact reuse is by far the most common reuse across all
entry methods, except for LastPass’ plugin and Copy&paste,
which have a noticeably high fraction of non-reused passwords
(e.g., 68 or 53% of all passwords entered with LastPass were
not reused) and have noticeably less password reuse than
the overall average. Looking at the password strength for all
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Figure 5. Breakdown of password reuse by entry method for all passwords.
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Figure 6. Breakdown of zxcvbn scores per entry method for unique passwords.
unique passwords (see Figure 6), one can see that 65% or
44 of all passwords entered with LastPass are stronger than
the overall average of 2.20, while the other entry methods
show a more balanced distribution across the zxcvbn scores
(except for score 0). In summary, this indicates that LastPass
shows an improved password strength (mean of 2.80 with
SD=1.07) and password uniqueness in comparison to the other
entry methods. Copy&paste exhibits the strongest password
uniqueness, however, at the same time the weakest password
strength (1.98 on average with a SD=1.33).
C. Grouping based on creation strategy
We grouped our participants based on their self-reported
strategies for creating new passwords (see Q9, Q13, and Q15
in Appendix A). Based on their answers, we discovered a
dichotomous grouping:
Group 1: Password managers/generators ("PWM"): First, we
identified participants that reported using a password generator,
either as integrated part of a password manager program (e.g.,
"I use lastpass.com, which automatically creates and saves
very strong passwords.") or as an extra service ("I use a service
to generate/create passwords that I put the parameters in that
I would like."). Many also implied the usage of a manager for
password storage (e.g., "I use a password creation and storage-
related browser extension that also is related to an installed
password manager application on my personal computer."),
however, some participants explicitly noted a separate storage
solution ("I use an app that creates random character strings
to pick new passwords for me. I then memorize it so I don’t
have to keep it written down" or "I will use a random password
generator. [...] I will save the new password in a secure location
such as a password protected flash drive."). In total, 45 (or
26.47%) out of 170 participants fit this category.
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Table VIII
SELF-REPORTED PREFERENCES FOR NEWLY CREATED PASSWORDS.
Group Ease of remembering Security Both
Human 69 (57.02%) 51 (42.15%) 1 (0.83%)
PWM 11 (22.45%) 38 (77.55%) 0
Group 2: Human-generated ("Human"): We discovered that
all 121 remaining participants described a strategy that abstains
from using technical means (like password managers). Almost
all of the participants in this group reported that they "try
to come up with a (random) combination of numbers, letters,
and characters," which prior work has shown to be prone to
efficient statistical, data-driven attacks [11], [21], [46], [32].
For instance, one participant symptomatically reported: "I think
of a word I want to use and will remember like. mouse. I then
decide to capitalize a letter in it like mOuse. I then add a
special character to the word like mOuse@. I then decided
a few numbers to add like mOuse@84." Only a very small
subgroup of seven participants reported using analog tools to
create passwords, such as dice or books ("I have a book on
my desk I pick a random page number and I use the first letter
of the first ten words and put the page number at the end and
a period after."), or using passphrases ("i use song lyrics then
add a random word at the end").
Many of the participants in this group also hinted in their
answer to their password storage strategies. For instance,
various participants emphasized ease of remembering as a
criteria for new passwords (e.g., "something easy to remember,
replace some letters with numbers."; see also Table VIII),
others use analog or digital storage (e.g., "I try to remember
something easy or I right[sic] it down on my computer and
copy&paste it when needed."). Many participants also outright
admitted re-using passwords as part of their strategy (e.g., "I
use the same password I always use because it has served me
well all these years" and "I have several go to words i use
and add numbers and symbols that i can remember").
1) Group demographics: We provide an overview of the
groups’ demographics in Table IX. We again used a Mann-
Whitney rank test to detect any significant differences in
the distributions of those two demographic groups. We find
that the two groups have statistically significant different
distribution for gender (U = 2,366, p = .016), computer
science background (U = 2,181, p < .001), and attitude towards
passwords (U = 3,440, p = .024). More participants in group 1
(PWM) identified themselves as male in comparison to group 2
(Human). The fractions of participants that have a computer
science background and that are optimistic about passwords
are higher in the group of password manager users. Gender and
computer science background are significantly correlated for
our participants (Fisher’s exact test: OR = 3.99, p = .005) as are
computer science background and password attitude (chi-square
test: χ2 = 9.24, p < .01). One hypothesis for this distribution
could be that computer science studies had historically more
male students and that their technical background may have
induced awareness of the importance of passwords as a security
Table IX
DEMOGRAPHICS OF OUR TWO PARTICIPANT CATEGORIES.
Human PWM
Number of participants
121 49
Gender
Female 59 (48.76%) 14 (28.57%)
Male 62 (51.24%) 35 (71.43%)
Age group
18–30 48 (39.67%) 16 (32.65%)
31–40 39 (32.23%) 24 (48.98%)
41–50 27 (22.31%) 5 (10.20%)
51–60 5 (4.13%) 3 (6.12%)
61–70 2 (1.65%) 0≥71 0 0 1 (2.04%)
Computer science background
Yes 10 (8.26%) 17 (34.69%)
No 111 (91.74%) 32 (65.13%)
Education level
Less than high school 0 1 (2.04%)
High school graduate 22 (18.18%) 4 (8.16%)
Some college, no degree 28 (23.14%) 6 (12.24%)
Associate’s degree 27 (22.31%) 7 (14.29%)
Bachelor degree 35 (28.93%) 27 (55.10%)
Ph.D. 0 1 (2.04%)
Graduate/prof. degree 9 (7.44%) 3 (6.12%)
Ethnicity
White/Caucasian 91 (75.21%) 32 (65.31%)
Black/African American 15 (12.40%) 10 (20.41%)
Asian 5 (4.13%) 4 (8.16%)
Hispanic/Latino 10 (8.26%) 2 (4.08%)
Multiracial 0 1 (2.04%)
Privacy concern (Westin index)
Privacy fanatic 45 (37.19%) 21 (42.86%)
Privacy unconcerned 15 (12.40%) 16 (32.65%)
Privacy pragmatist 61 (50.41%) 12 (24.49%)
Attitude about passwords
Pessimist 1 (0.83%) 2 (4.08%)
Optimist 88 (72.73%) 44 (89.80%)
Conflicted 32 (26.45%) 3 (6.12%)
Prior password leaked experienced
No 53 (43.80%) 19 (38.78%)
Yes 44 (36.36%) 14 (28.57%)
Not aware of 24 (19.83%) 16 (32.65%)
Table X
DISTRIBUTION OF ENTRY METHODS PER PARTICIPANT GROUP.
Entry method Group 1 (PWM) Group 2 (Human)
All passwords
Chrome auto-fill 242 (46.36%) 707 (56.79%)
Human 160 (30.65%) 430 (34.54%)
LastPass plugin 93 (17.82%) 35 (2.81%)
Copy&paste 16 (3.07%) 39 (3.13%)
Unknown plugin 8 (1.53%) 33 (2.65%)
External manager 3 (0.57%) 1 (0.08%)∑ 522 1245
Unique passwords
Chrome auto-fill 144 (42.99%) 396 (55.77%)
Human 101 (30.15%) 230 (32.39%)
LastPass plugin 72 (21.49%) 28 (3.94%)
Copy&paste 14 (4.18%) 37 (5.21%)
Unknown plugin 4 (1.19%) 19 (2.68%)∑ 335 710
measure and the promised benefits of password managers.
2) Comparison of password strength and reuse: Figures 7
and 8 provide a comparison of the password strength and
reuse between the two participant groups. The hatched bars
indicate the overall number of passwords per zxcvbn score
and reuse category, respectively. The plain bars break the
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Figure 7. Password strength distribution by participant group and broken
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Figure 8. Distribution of password reuse categories by participant group and
broken down by detected entry method. Hatched bars show total number of
passwords per category. (Note the different y-axis limits)
number of passwords down by entry method. Participants in
group 1 (PWM) entered in total 522 passwords and participants
in group 2 (Human) entered in total 1245 passwords (both
numbers include reused passwords, see Table X).
For password strength (see Figure 7), neither group contained
a noticeable fraction of the weakest passwords with score 0.
However, group 2 shows a clear tendency towards weaker
passwords. For instance, there are almost twice as many score 1
passwords (n = 390) than score 4 passwords (n = 191). In
contrast, the most frequent score for group 1 is 2 (n = 158),
but the distribution shows a lower kurtosis (e.g., scores 1,3,
and 4 have the frequencies 126, 113, and 114). When breaking
the number of passwords down by their entry method, Chrome
auto-fill is the dominating entry method for all zxcvbn scores
1–4 in both groups except for score 1 in group 1, where
manually entered passwords are most frequent. However, for
group 1 the fraction of passwords entered with LastPass’ plugin
(n = 93 or 17.82% of the passwords) is considerably larger
than for group 2 (n = 35 or 2.81%). In particular, for group 1,
passwords entered with LastPass have mostly scores higher
than 2 (n = 82), where score 4 is the most frequent (n = 32).
Regarding password reuse (see Figure 8), the most frequent
category is exactly-and-partially reused (n = 189 or 36.21% for
group 1; n = 555 or 44.58% for group 2). However, group 1
shows a bimodal distribution in which not-reused passwords
are almost as frequent (n = 187) as exactly-and-partially reused
ones. Further, Chrome auto-fill is the dominating entry method
for all reuse categories in both groups. However, when breaking
the passwords down by entry method, more than half (n = 49
or 52.69%) of the passwords entered with LastPass in group 1
have not been reused in any way. The vast majority of reused
passwords can be attributed to manual entry and Chrome auto-
fill. In group 1, 335 or 64.18% of the passwords have been
reused and in group 2 979 or 78.63% of the passwords. Of the
335 reused passwords in group 1, 278 or 82.99% passwords
have been entered manually or with Chrome auto-fill. In
group 2, 926 or 74.38% of the reused passwords were entered
manually or with Chrome auto-fill.
D. Case-study: Active LastPass users
We were interested in how consistent users of password
managers employ their tools during their normal web browsing.
Our dataset contains 15 users that entered at least one password
with a known password manager plugin and for which we are
hence certain that they are users of a password manager solution
(e.g., we cannot be certain about users that copy&paste all
their passwords from a manager into the password fields). All
of those 15 users employ LastPass as manager. Figure 9 gives
an overview of those 15 users’ password properties.
We can observe that, except for user 3, all users entered
passwords through at least one additional entry method, most
even two methods, however, LastPass’ plugin is the primary
entry method for 10 of the 15 users and on average 52% of
the passwords in this selection were entered through LastPass
(SD=31%). Interestingly, user 3 gave no indication in the
survey sampling for using a password manager and hence is in
group 2 (Human), but was the only user to enter all passwords
through LastPass. Of the 15 users, four users did not enter any
strong password with zxcvbn score 4 and every user entered at
least one password with zxcvbn score smaller than 4 through
LastPass. Nevertheless, the mean zxcvbn score (mean=2.72,
SD=0.58) of this selection of participants is above the global
average. All but user 11 reused at least one password either
partially, exactly, or both. User 15 even reused all of their
passwords. The average user in this selection reused 60% of
their passwords. That is below the global average in our dataset.
Although there are some users that seem to particularly
benefit from using LastPass (e.g., users 3, 6, 11, and 12 are
heavy LastPass users with low reuse and strong passwords),
we could neither confirm nor refute a statistically significant
correlation between ratio of LastPass passwords per user and
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Figure 9. Distribution of entry methods, zxcvbn scores, and password reuse
for active LastPass users. Users from group 2 (Human) are marked *.
either ratio of strong or non-reused passwords, since presuming
a small or medium sized effect the number of LastPass users
in our dataset is too small for a statistical test with sufficient
testpower.
E. Modelling password strength and reuse
To get a better understanding of the influencing factors for
password strength and reuse we conducted several regression
analyses that include the effects of the users strategies as well as
their password manager usage. To account for the hierarchical
structure of our data, where individual password entries are
grouped under the corresponding participant, we calculated
multi-level (aka hierarchical) logistic- or ordinal-regressions
that allow the intercepts to vary at the participant level. By
comparing simple and multi-level models for reuse and strength,
the significant superiority of the latter was demonstrated. Thus,
we report here only the final multi-level regression models and
how they were constructed.
1) Correlation analysis: Before constructing the models,
we started out with a correlation analysis of the available
factors (e.g., password composition, participant group, self-
reported website value, etc.). As multi-level models are
highly vulnerable to multicollinearity, detecting and potentially
removing strongly correlated variables is essential to prevent
inaccurate model estimations which could lead to false positive
results. In our dataset, we detected a very high, significant
correlation between zxcvbn scores and password composition,
in particular password length, as well as with the NIST and
Shannon entropies. Since we consider zxcvbn a more realistic
measurement of crackability, we omitted NIST and Shannon
entropies from our model. Investigation of zxcvbn showed that
zxcvbn rewards lengthy passwords with better scores and that
its pattern and l33t speak detection can penalize passwords
with digits and special characters. Since zxcvbn is the more
interesting factor for us and since it partially contains the effect
of the password composition on the prediction, we excluded
password composition parameters from our models. Moreover,
we noticed that password reuse was strongly correlated with
the presence of a lowercase character in the password. A closer
inspection of our dataset showed, that our data contained a
number of PINs, which were all unique, and that every non-
PIN password contains at least one lowercase character. In
this situation, including the presence/absence of lowercase
characters would result in our model just distinguishing between
PINs and non-PINs when predicting password reuse.
a) Website category as proxy for website value: Com-
monly the website category is used as a proxy for the website
value. Since we collected both, self-reported website value
from the in-situ questionnaire and website category from the
domain, we can provide insights into this general assumption.
Figure 10 shows the self-reported value per respective domain.
For instance, in more than 70% of all logged passwords
for a financial domain, the user reported a very high value
for that domain. Similarly, in more than 60% of all logged
passwords for news websites, the users (strongly) disagreed
that this domain has a high value. Unfortunately, domains
with an unknown category, which form the bulk of our logged
passwords (632 or 35.8% of all logged entries; see Table XI),
did not show a clear tendency towards high or low value.
Although prior works [50] used the website category in
comparable models, in our regression models, we decided for
above stated reasons on using the self-reported website value
instead of the website category as a predictor.
2) Constructing the models: Selecting an appropriate model
corresponding to the empirical data is a crucial step in every
regression based analysis. This process ensures that only sets
of variable are included that significantly explain variation
in the empirical data. To this end, for both password reuse
and password strength prediction, we started with a base
model without any explanatory variables, which we iteratively
extended with additional predictors. Tables XII and XIII
present the goodness of fit for the relevant steps in this model
building process. According to the scale level of our dependent
variable and the hierarchical structure of our data, we build
an ordinal multi-level regression model for the zxcvbn scores
(Table XII) and a logistic multi-level regression model for
the password reuse (Table XIII). To verify that a multi-level
approach suits our data better than a simple regression model
we first tested basic multi-level models for password reuse and
password strength without any explanatory variables against
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Figure 10. Self-reported website value per website category
Table XI
NUMBER OF LOGINS FOR EACH WEBSITE CATEGORY BY OUR PARTICIPANTS.
Category Count %
Shopping 240 13.9
Social networking 167 9.5
Tech/Software/Filesharing 116 6.6
Portal 101 5.7
Finance 94 5.3
News/Media/Entertainment 93 5.3
Education 87 4.9
Government/society 70 4.0
Business & economy 57 3.2
News/Headline_Links/Collaborative 49 2.8
Hobby/Interest/Game 42 2.4
Health 6 0.3
Insurance/Auto 6 0.3
Job/search 4 0.2
Research Methods/Science 2 0.1
Resources 1 0.1
Unknown 632 35.8
the corresponding simple regression models. Both multi-level
models fitted the data significantly better.
Process of model fitting: Throughout the main process of
model selection, we extended both multi-level models in three
steps by adding sets of predictors. In three steps we included:
1) variables measured at the login level: a) the entry method of
the password, b) the self-reported website value and c) the self-
reported password strength; 2) variables measured at the user
level: a) the number of submitted passwords per user, b) the
password creation strategy of the user and c) the self-reported
password management strategies of the user; 3) the cross level
interactions between the user’s password creation strategy an
the detected entry method.
This approach not only allows us to evaluate the effects of
the individual explanatory variables, but also to investigate the
interplay between different storage strategies and the password
creation strategy of the users. In each iteration we computed
the model fit and used log likelihood model fit comparison
to check whether the new, more complex model fit the data
significantly better than the previous one. As our final model
we picked the one with the best fit that was significant better
Table XII
GOODNESS OF FIT FOR THE MODELS PREDICTING ZCVBN SCORES
AIC logLik df Pr(>Chisq)
simple regression 5080.6 -2536.3
multi-level base 4536.7 -2263.4 1 <0.001
+ login level 4316.3 -2147.1 6 <0.001
+ user level 4320.4 -2143.2 6 0.2494034
+ interactions 4309.5 -2133.7 4 <0.001
Table XIII
GOODNESS OF FIT FOR THE MODELS PREDICTING PASSWORD REUSE
AIC logLik Df Pr(>Chisq)
simple regression 1959.7 -978.84
multi-level base 1794.6 -895.28 1 < 0.001
+ login level 1694.9 -839.46 6 < 0.001
+ user level 1684.7 -828.37 6 <0.01
+ interactions 1687.6 -825.80 4 0.27351
in explaining the empirical data than the previous models. This
is a well established procedure for model building in, e.g.,
social sciences and psychological research [33], [26], [10],
[16], and allows creation of models that have the best trade-off
of complexity, stability, and fitness.
Selecting the appropriate model: All models are com-
pared according to the corresponding akaike information
criterion (AIC), which is an estimator of the relative quality of
statistical models for a given set of data. Smaller AIC scores
indicate a better fitting model. Additionally, the models are
statistically compared using likelihood-ratio tests, which are
evaluated using a Chi-squared distribution. The final model is
selected based on AIC as well as their ability to describe the
empirical data better than the previous models.
3) Model for zxcvbn score: For the zxcvbn score an ordinal
model with all predictors and also the mentioned interaction
described our data best. The model is presented in Table XIV.
The interactions between the self-reported password creation
strategy (q9:generator; see Q9 in Appendix A) and the detected
entry methods Chrome auto-fill, copy&paste, and LastPass
were significant predictors in our model. Those entry methods
and also the creation strategy are not significant predictors of
password strength on their own. This means that using such
a password management/entry tool only leads to significant
improvement in the password strength when the users also
employ some supporting techniques (password generator) for
the creation of their passwords.
The model might suggest that a general password entry
with a plugin (other than LastPass in our dataset) increased
the likelihood of a strong password. However, this could be
attributed to the high standard error resulting from the minimal
data for this entry method.
Moreover the self-reported password strength was a sig-
nificant predictor of the measured password strength. This
indicates that the users may have a very clear view on the
strength of the passwords they have entered.
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Table XIV
LOGISTIC MULTI-LEVEL REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING ZXCVBN SCORE.
ESTIMATES ARE IN RELATION TO MANUALLY ENTERED PASSWORDS BY A
HUMAN. STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT PREDICTORS ARE SHADED.
INTERACTIONS ARE MARKED WITH *.
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
em:chrome 0.07 0.12 0.59 0.56
em:copy/paste -0.13 0.35 -0.89 0.37
em:lastpass 0.24 0.35 0.69 0.49
em:unknownplugin 1.02 0.34 2.97 <0.01
in-situ:value 0.02 0.05 0.48 0.63
in-situ:strength 0.89 0.07 12.68 <0.001
user:entries 0.02 0.02 0.69 0.49
q9:generator -0.45 0.67 -0.68 0.50
q14:memorize -0.24 0.30 -0.79 0.43
q14:analog 0.05 0.29 0.16 0.88
q14:digital 0.09 0.31 0.29 0.77
q14:pwm -0.16 0.28 -0.57 0.57
em:chrome * q9:generator 2.30 0.60 3.84 <0.001
em:copy/paste * q9:generator 3.40 1.22 2.79 <0.01
em:lastpass * q9:generator 1.83 0.82 2.24 <0.05
em:unknownplugin * q9:generator 0.22 1.34 0.16 0.87
em: Entry method; q9: Creation strategy; q14: Storage strategy; in-situ: Plugin questionnaire
4) Model for password reuse: For password reuse a logisti-
cal model with all predictors but without interactions described
our data best. Table XV presents our regression model to predict
password reuse. Reuse was significantly influenced by the entry
method of the password. In contrast to human entry the odds
for reuse were 2.85 time lower if the password was entered
with LastPass (odds ratio 0.35, averaged predicted probability
of reuse with Lastpass = 48,35%) and even 14.29 times lower
if entered via copy&paste (odds ratio 0.07, averaged predicted
probability of reuse with copy&paste = 19,81%). Interestingly,
the input via Google Chrome auto-fill even had a negative effect
on the uniqueness of the passwords. In contrast to human entry
the odds for reuse were 1.65 times higher if the password
was entered with Chrome auto-fill (odds ratio 0.35, averaged
predicted probability of reuse with Chrome auto-fill = 83.72%).
A further significant predictor of password reuse is the user’s
approach of creating passwords. For users who use technical
tools to create their passwords (q9:generator), the chances are
3.70 times as high that the passwords are not reused (odds ratio
0.27, predicted probability of reuse if technical tools are used =
47,36%). In contrast to the models explaining the zxcvbn-score,
our data does not indicate the presence of an interaction effect
of the user’s password creation strategy on the relation between
entry method and password reuse.
In addition, we found a positive relation between the the
numbers of passwords entered by users and the reuse of these
passwords. In our model, each additional password of the user
increases the chance that it will be reused by 6% (odds ratio
1.06). This suggests that with increasing numbers of passwords,
it becomes more likely that some of them will be reused, which
is in line with prior research [28].
We also found the self-reported value and password strength
of users a statistically significant predictor for reuse [9].
Passwords entered to a website with a higher value for the
user were less likely to be reused (odds ratio of 0.87) and also
passwords that the users considered stronger were less likely
Table XV
LOGISTIC MULTI-LEVEL REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING PASSWORD
REUSE. ESTIMATES ARE IN RELATION TO MANUALLY ENTERED PASSWORDS
BY A HUMAN. STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT PREDICTORS ARE SHADED.
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 2.62 0.45 5.80 <0.001
em:chrome 0.46 0.16 2.81 <0.01
em:copy/paste -2.68 0.41 -6.54 <0.001
em:lastpass -1.05 0.37 -2.86 <0.01
em:unknownplugin 0.76 0.51 1.51 0.13
in-situ:value -0.13 0.06 -2.01 <0.05
in-situ:strength -0.21 0.08 -2.50 <0.05
user:entries 0.06 0.02 2.67 <0.01
q9:generator -1.31 0.40 -3.24 <0.01
q14:memorize 0.22 0.25 0.88 0.38
q14:analog -0.48 0.24 -1.98 <0.05
q14:digital -0.18 0.26 -0.70 0.48
q14:pwm -0.07 0.24 -0.30 0.76
em: Entry method; q9: Creation strategy; q14: Storage strategy; in-situ: Plugin questionnaire
to be reused (odds ratio of 0.81).
Lastly, users that reported using an analog password storage
(q14:analog; see Q14 in Appendix A) were less likely to reuse
their passwords (odds ratio of 0.62).
V. DISCUSSION
We discuss the results and limitations of our study on
password managers’ impact on password strength and reuse.
A. Password Managers’ Impact
In general, our participants showed very similar password
strength and reuse characteristics as in prior studies [50],
[65] and our analysis could also reaffirm prior results, such
as rampant password reuse and high share of low-strength
passwords, and extend them, e.g., when asked in-situ users
made very accurate estimates of their passwords’ strength.
Our study adds novel insights to the existing literature
by considering the exact password entry methods and when
painting a more complete picture by considering the users’
password creation strategies (e.g., consider the following
participant statement for a mixed strategy: "I think Keepass
is 100% safe but it is annoying having to copy and paste
passwords every time so I also use Chrome’s built in password
saving feature."). We found that almost all users entered
passwords with more than one entry method. Further, we
discovered that every entry method exhibited reused passwords,
although the ratio of reused passwords differ significantly
between the entry methods. More than 80% of Chrome auto-
filled passwords were reused, while only 47% of the passwords
entered with LastPass’ plugins were reused in some way,
and even only 22% of the copy/pasted passwords. Similarly,
we noticed that low-strength passwords have been entered
with all entry methods, where LastPass had on average the
strongest passwords (mean of 2.80). Interestingly, manually
entered passwords and Chrome auto-filled passwords showed
very similar characteristics of being on a par with the overall
password strength, but showing above average reuse rate.
When looking at active users of 3rd party password man-
agement software in separation, we found that only very few
14
users came close to the picture of an "ideal" password manager
user, i.e., all passwords entered with the manager, no password
reuse, exclusively strong passwords. Instead, most of those
users show a mixture of entry methods, password strength, and
password reuse. Perhaps interestingly, not copy/paste, as might
be expected from password managers’ workflows, but Google’s
auto-fill feature was the second most used entry method
after LastPass’ plugin. This highlights, that to understand the
influence of password managers, not only the entry methods,
but also the users’ strategy has to be taken into account.
For our participants, we discovered a dichotomous distribu-
tion of self-reported creation strategies. Participants indicated
using a password generator right now or in the recent past,
or clearly described mental algorithms and similar methods
for human-generated passwords; only a negligible fraction of
participants mentioned analog tools or alternative strategies
(like two-factor authentication). Taking a differentiated view
based on the creation strategies, we find that users of a password
generator are closer to a desirable situation with stronger, less
reused passwords, although being far from ideal.
Using regression modelling, we put our data together to a
more complete view of password manager’s influence. Our
models suggest that the interaction between the creation strategy
and the entry methods has significant influence on the password
strength. If the passwords are entered with technical support
(auto-fill, password manager plugin, or copy&paste), this
results in stronger passwords under the condition that technical
means were already used when generating the passwords in
the first place. Thus, password managers that provide users
with password creation features indeed positively influence the
overall password strength in the ecosystem. All the more, it
is curious that Google Chrome, as the primary tool to access
websites, has the password generation feature disabled by
default [8]. Future work could investigate and compare Apple’s
walled-garden ecosystem, where the Safari browser has this
feature enabled by default.
Our models further suggest, that the use of password
generators and the website value also significantly reduced
the chance of password reuse. More interestingly, however, is
that the password storage strategies have different influence
independently of an interaction with the creation strategy. Using
a password manager plugin or copy&pasting passwords reduced
password reuse, while Chrome’s auto-fill aggravated reuse. In
other words, we observed that users were able to manually
create more unique passwords when managing their passwords
digitally or with a manager, but not with Chrome auto-fill.
The benefit of password managers is also put into better
perspective when considering particular strategies in our
group 2 (human-generated passwords). We noticed that users
tend to have a "self-centered" view when it comes to passwords’
uniqueness (i.e., personal vs. global), but are unaware of the
fact that an attacker would not be concerned with personal
uniqueness of passwords. A large fraction of users reported
to "come up with [a password they] have never used before",
to "use some words [they] would be familiar with but other
weren’t", or to "try to think of something that [they] have never
used before". Those results also align with prior studies of
password behavior [55], [51], [39].
Further, in light of the high relevance of copy&paste for
strong and unique passwords, our results can also underline the
"Cobra effect" [36], [37], [47] of disabling paste functionality
for password fields on websites to encourage the use of two-
factor authentication or usage of password managers.
The conclusion we draw from our results is that password
managers indeed provide benefits to the users’ password
strength and uniqueness. Although both benefits can be
achieved separately, our data suggests that indeed the integrated
workflow of 3rd party password managers for generation and
storage provides the highest benefits. However, we did not
detect the ideal user of password managers, but, on the opposite,
that even users of 3rd party password manager still exhibit a
high ratio of reused passwords and less than desired strong
passwords. Even more troublesome is that our results suggest
that the most widely used manager, Chrome’s password saving
and auto-filling feature, has only a positive effect on password
strength when used in conjunction with an additional generator
and even has an aggravating effect on password reuse. For
studying password managers’ influence on password security,
our results show that a more holistic view has to be taken that
considers both the exact password entry method and users’
password creation and storage strategy. Simply focusing on
only one of those factors will not yield the necessary insights.
B. Impressions of password managers
Lastly, we collected from our participants at different
points in our survey—survey sampling and exit survey—their
impressions and opinions about password managers. Those
collected information provide insights into why users abstain
from using password managers, to which contexts users restrict
usage of managers, and also hint at misunderstood security
benefits of managers.
Reasons for abstaining from password managers: Given
the benefits of password managers, we were interested in our
participants’ reasons to abstain from using them. Table XVI
summarizes the results of our exit survey. We found that users
have a discomfort with relinquishing control of their passwords
to password managers, they do not believe that password
managers provided more security, or see a non-necessity of
password managers. Noticeably, the same reasons were given
not only for abstaining from password managers, but also why
users stopped using them. Of our 109 exit survey participants,
19 affirmed stopping to use a password manager for one of
said reasons. Prototypical answers were "It was confusing, I
did not know how to use it, and was afraid of being blocked
out of my passwords.", "I became skeptical of its security. I
did a little research and found its possible to crack", or "After
the free trial was up they wanted a fee, so I cancelled it. I felt
that it was not that useful to me. The browser seemed to do
the same thing with more efficiency and less bother. Plus the
program was annoying .I kept offering a pop up asking me for
this and that." The answers we received from our participants
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Table XVI
EXIT SURVEY’S RESULT
Users do not use any kind of 3rd party password managers because...
the participants do not trust vendor/software 37.61%
they cost lots of money 20.18%
they are not really easy to set up/ easy to use 11.93%
of lack of synchronization between users’ different device 7.34%
of lack of support for the user device 2.75%
Other Reasons
Chrome’s password saving feature suffices for the users 59.63%
can handle managing the password w/o manager 37.61%
did not think about it before 29.36%
not sure which one is better 24.77%
in our exit survey (ES1 and ES4 in Appendix B) are aligned
with the results of prior studies [15], [40].
Password managers as single point of failure: We also no-
ticed the high amount of users’ distrust into password managers
in our participants’ answers in our survey sampling. When
asked about their impressions’ of password managers, various
participants expressed concerns about managed passwords as a
single point of failure. The concerns included software security
issues, such as● "I think that it saves time but also generates a way for
hackers to steal the information for themselves."● "It’s not that secure, if someone managed to hack me or
get a virus in they’d get everything stored in there."● "I would never use my browser’s manager should my
computer ever be hacked. I do trust LastPass for my pass
word protection and do change my passwords on a regular
basis. I keep my LastPass main password written down
in a secure place in my home."● "I can see using the password saving feature of a browser
as being convenient, but it leaves the user vulnerable to
hackers who find a security breach."● "I feel that using my browser password saving feature
is dangerous so I hate to think about it. If hackers hack
just my browser they would have a bunch of passwords. I
don’t store them all on there for that reason."● "I don’t like using the browser saving feature, makes me
feel like someone can hack into my browser, like Google
and then get to my passwords. I do use it though for non-
security sites, like signing up for emails from an on-line
store, but not for anything that needs stronger security. I
like some of the password managers, but I feel like I am
not utilizing them efficiently and also feel like they could
still be hacked. I am probably just paranoid. Still makes
me nervous, though."● "I try not to use the save password feature because of
an exploit found not too long ago that allowed people to
steal your passwords by using that feature. Lastpass is
very easy to use and is a good way to store the passwords
and it also lets you generate new passwords that are safe
to use. It makes it so that you don’t have to try and come
up with your own hand crafted passwords."
Perhaps surprisingly, our participants also expressed often
concern about physical attacks, e.g., illegitimate persons
accessing their devices or when sharing devices with other
users. We noticed that many of our participants reported
in their impressions of password managers that they only
use them on non-shared and/or stationary devices, because
otherwise another device user or thief could easily gain access
to accounts using the saved passwords. Maybe interestingly,
the received descriptions fit more to browser built-in password
managers, which, in contrast to 3rd party managers, by default
not protect the password storage with a master password,
which in the event of device sharing or device loss forms an
additional protection against immediate password leakage and
misuse. For some users, those concerns affect their password
storage strategies, for instance, by restricting usage of password
managers to less important websites. Prototypical answers that
expressed those concerns were:
● "I don’t like using the browser to store them because I
use the same browser across devices and wouldn’t want
someone to be able to get my passwords if my phone was
stolen. I like using LastPass because it has a password
protecting all of the other passwords. It feels safer than
just saving them with the browser."● "I don’t feel like it is the most secure. What if someone
steals my laptop? But, I use it anyway, because the reward
outweighs the risk. Most likely no one will steal my laptop.
And I do not carry it around with me, it stays at home."● "My impression is fairly good using the browser. Unless
my computer or phone is stolen and then hacked I’m
pretty safe."● "It’s probably not the safest thing in the world but I don’t
think my laptop will get stolen and no one else has access
to my laptop soo..."● "I think for personal use, using a browser’s password
saving feature is fine. It’s true that someone could steal
the computer and get in, but I consider that to be an
acceptable risk in the name of ease of use. [...]"● "I use it to automatically save some of my passwords on
some sites so that I don’t have to manually type it every
time. It is useful, and I like it. My only concern is that
it could provide unwanted access if my computer were
stolen, but given how and where I use it this is fairly
unlikely."● "I guess the browser built in password savers are password
managers, but they are not secure. any number of programs
can dump the passwords, but they are convenient for
loggin [sic] and it does save copying and pasteing [sic].
I am the only one using this computer so I would have
to scramble if it were every stolen or compromised"
Misunderstood security benefits of password managers:
Lastly, we also noticed a very few cases that users attributed
password managers security benefits that this software does
not offer. For instance, one user noted that a password manager
offers protection against password leakage through keyloggers
("Using my browser’s password saving feature is a matter
of convenient as it allows me to not have to always type in
my password and it’s a feature that I feel is fairly secure.
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Also, not having to type in a password, allows me to bypass
keylogger and other risks that may be associated with frequent
use of typing in password."), which is only true in a limited
set of scenarios (e.g., compromised keyboard firmware or USB
keylogging devices on the keyboard USB port), but does not
hold when the end-user device is compromised with malware.
In the latter case, malware might steal the password database
and log the user’s master password for that database, if set.
C. Threats to validity
As with other human-subject and field studies, we cannot
eliminate all threats to the validity of our study. We targeted
Google Chrome users, which had in general [7] the highest
market share and also among our survey participants. Further,
we recruited only experienced US workers on Amazon MTurk,
which might not be representative for any population or
other cultures (external validity), however, our demographics
and password statistics show alignment with prior studies.
Furthermore, we collected our data in the wild, which yields
a high ecological validity and avoids common problems of
password lab studies [42], but on the downside does not give
control over all variables (internal validity). We asked our
participants to behave naturally and also tried to encourage this
behavior through transparency, availability, and above average
payment, however, like closest related work [65], [50] we
cannot exclude that some participants behaved unusually.
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented a study on the influence of password managers
on password strength and reuse. In our study, we created a
more complete view on password managers by combining
background data on users, in particular their password storage
and creation strategies, with in-situ collected password metrics,
most noticeable the passwords’ entry methods (e.g., manual
entry, browser plugin, copy&paste). Using exploratory data
analysis and statistical testing, including regression models,
we show that password managers indeed influence password
strength and reuse. This is in contrast to prior studies, which
did not consider the combination of exact entry method and
users’ strategies. Whether this influence is beneficial or not,
however, depends on how well the manager integrates with
the user’s creation strategy. We found that users that rely
on technical support for password creation had both stronger
and more unique passwords, even if entered through other
channels than the password manager. We also found, that
Google Chrome aggravated the password reuse problem. Future
work could explore password managers’ influence in other
ecosystems, such as Apple’s walled-garden ecosystem or
mobile password managers. Moreover, the absence of any ideal
password manager user would warrant further investigation into
users’ behaviors and strategies and how to further amplify the
positive effect of managers (e.g., further decreasing password
reuse).
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APPENDIX A
INITIAL SURVEY QUESTIONS
Q1: For each of the following statements, how strongly do
you agree or disagree?
a1: Consumer have lost all control over how personal
information is collected and used by companies.
a2: Most businesses handle the personal information they
collect about consumers in a proper and confidential way.
a3: Existing laws and organizational practices provide a
reasonable level of protection for consumer privacy today.
(i) Strongly disagree, (ii) Somewhat disagree, (iii) Somewhat
agree, (iv) Strongly agree
Q2: On how many different Internet sites do you have a user
account that is secured with a password? (If you are not sure
about the number please estimate the number) (FreeText)
Q3: Has ever one of your passwords been leaked or been
stolen?
(i) Yes, (ii) No, (iii) I am not aware of that, (iv) I do not care
Q4: How strongly do you agree or disagree:?
b1. Passwords are useless, because hackers can steal my
data either way.
(i) Strongly disagree, (ii) Somewhat disagree, (iii) Somewhat
agree, (iv) Strongly agree
b2. I don’t care about my passwords’ strength, because I
don’t have anything to hide.
(i) Strongly disagree, (ii) Somewhat disagree, (iii) Somewhat
agree, (iv) Strongly agree
Q5: What characterizes in your opinion a strong/secure
password? (FreeText)
Q6: Please rate the strength of the following passwords?
c1. thHisiSaSecUrePassWord
c2. Pa$sWordsk123
c3. AiWuutaiveep9j
c4. !@#$%&ˆ*()
c5. 12/07/2017
(i) Very weak, (ii) Weak, (iii) Moderate strength, (iv) Strong,
(v) Very strong
Q7: I have never used a computer?
(i) I have never, (ii) I do
Q8: How would you rate your ability to create strong
passwords?
(i) 5(high ability), (ii) 4, (iii) 3, (iv) 2, (v) 1(low ability)
Q9: How do you proceed if you have to create a new
password? (What is your strategy?) (FreeText)
Q10: I try to create secure passwords.....
(i) for all my accounts and websites, (ii) for my email accounts,
(iii) for online shopping, (iv) for online booking/reservation,
(v) for social networks, (vi) No answer, (vii) Other
Q11: I make a point of changing my passwords on websites
that are critical to my privacy every...... (choose the closest
match)
(i) Day, (ii) Week, (iii) Two weeks, (iv) Month, (v) 6 month,
(vi) Year, (vii) Never, (viii) Other
Q12: Do you use the same password for different email
accounts, websites, or devices?
(i) Yes, (ii) No
Q13: Do you use any of the following strategies for creating
your password or part of your password, anywhere, at any
time in the last year...
(i) I used the name of celebrities as a password or as a part
of a password, (ii) I used the name of family members as a
password or as a part of a password, (iii) I used literature
(book, poetry, etc.) as a password or as a part of a password,
(iv) I used familiar numbers (street address, employee number,
etc) as a password or as a part of a password, (v) I used
random characters as a password, (vi) I used a password
manager to generate passwords, (vii) No answer, (viii) Other
Q14: How do you remember all of your passwords?
(i) I write them down on paper (notebook, day planner, etc),
(ii) I try to remember them (human memory), (iii) I use
computer files (Word document, Excel sheet, text file, etc),
(iv) I use encrypted computer files (e.g. CryptoPad), (v) I
store my passwords on my mobile phone or PDA, (vi) I
use 3rd party password manager (save in extra program,
e.g. LastPass, keepass, 1Password, etc.), (vii) I use website
cookies (Website checkbox: "Remember my password on this
computer"), (viii) I use the same password for more than one
purpose, (ix) I use browser built-in password manager (i.e
saved in browser), (x) I use a variation of a past password
(eg. password1 and then password2 and then password3, etc.),
(xi) No answer, (xii) Other
Q15: Have you ever used a computer program to generate
your passwords?
(i) Yes, (ii) No
Q16: When creating a new password, which do you regard as
most important: choosing a password that is easy to remember
for future use (ease of remembering) or the password’s
security?
(i) Always ease of remembering, (ii) Mostly ease of
remembering, (iii) Mostly security, (iv) Always security,
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(v) Other
Q17: When you create a new password, which of the following
factors do you consider? The password ....
(i) does not contain dictionary words, (ii) is in a foreign
(non-English) language, (iii) is not related to the site (i.e., the
name of the site), (iv) includes numbers, (v) includes special
characters (e.g. "&" or "!"), (vi) is at least eight (8) characters
long, (vii) None of the above: I didn’t think about it, (viii) No
answer, (ix) Other
Q18: My home planet is Earth?
(i) Yes, (ii) No
Q19: Do you use the "save password" feature of your
browser?
(i) Yes, (ii) No
Q20: Do you use any kind of extra password manager program
(for instance, LastPass, 1Password, Keepass, Dashlane, etc.)?
(i) Yes, (ii) No
Q21: Which password manager(s) do you use? (You can write
one name per line) (FreeText)
Q22: Please give us a short description of your impression of
using your browser’s password saving feature and/or of using
extra password managers (FreeText)
Q23: How many passwords do you keep in your password
manager(s) and browser’s saved passwords? (if you don’t
know the exact number, please estimate the number) (FreeText)
Q24: I am (i) Female, (ii) Male, (iii) Other, (iv) No answer
Q25: My age group is (i) under 18 years, (ii) 18 to 30, (iii) 31
to 40, (iv) 41 to 50, (v) 51 to 60, (vi) 61 to 70, (vii) 71 or
older, (viii) Other
Q26: My native language is (FreeText)
Q27: My primary web browser is (i) Chrome, (ii) Firefox,
(iii) Internet explorer/ Edge, (iv) Safari, (v) Opera, (vi) Other
Q28: For browsing websites, I use (i) Almost exclusively
my smartphone/tablet, (ii) Mostly my smartphone / tablet,
(iii) Almost exclusively my desktop / laptop computer,
(iv) Mostly my desktop / laptop computer
Q29: What is the highest degree or level of education you
have completed?
(i) Less than high school, (ii) High school graduate (includes
equivalency), (iii) Some collage/no degree, (iv) Associate’s
degree, (v) Bachelor’s degree, (vi) Ph.D, (vii) Graduate or
professional degree, (viii) Other
Q30: Are you majoring in or do you have a degree or job
in computer science, computer engineering, information
technology, or a related field?
(i) Yes, (ii) No
Q31: What is your ethnicity?
(i) White/Caucasian, (ii) Black/African American, (iii) Asian,
(iv) Hispanic/Latino, (v) Middle Eastern, (vi) Native
American/Alaska native, (vii) Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander,
(viii) Multiracial, (ix) Other
APPENDIX B
EXIT SURVEY QUESTIONS
ES1: I do not use any kind of 3rd party password manager,
such as 1Password, LastPass, etc,. because?
(i) I do not trust the password manager software or vendor,
(ii) of the lack of support for my devices, (iii) of the lack of
synchronization between different devices, (iv) I would have
to spent money on it, (v) they are not simple to set up and/or
not easy to use, (vi) I can manage my passwords myself
and a password manager would not provide any additional
benefits, (vii) Chrome’s password saving feature suffices for
me, (viii) there are too many available managers and I am
not sure which one would be right for me, (ix) I never really
thought about using a 3rd party password manager or was
never interested in them, (x) Other
ES2: Have you ever used any kind of 3rd party password
manager in the past, and then stopped using it?
(i) Yes, (ii) No
ES3: Please mention which 3rd party password manager have
you used in the past. (FreeText)
ES4: Please shortly explain the reasons why you stopped
using the 3rd party password manager. (FreeText)
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